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Abstract
This paper investigates the maximal secret communication rate over a wiretap channel subject
to reliability and secrecy constraints at a given blocklength. New achievability and converse bounds
are derived, which are uniformly tighter than existing bounds, and lead to the tightest bounds on the
second-order coding rate for discrete memoryless and Gaussian wiretap channels. The exact second-
order coding rate is established for semi-deterministic wiretap channels, which characterizes the optimal
tradeoff between reliability and secrecy in the finite-blocklength regime. Underlying our achievability
bounds are two new privacy amplification results, which not only refine the existing results, but also
achieve stronger notions of secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The pioneering work of Wyner [1] and Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2] has characterized the max-
imal secret communication rate – called the secrecy capacity – at which information can be
transmitted securely and reliably over a wiretap channel. In particular, it was shown that both
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2the error probability and the information leakage can be made as small as desired, as long
as the transmission rate is below the secrecy capacity and as long as the data are mapped to
sufficiently long codewords. Since then, there have been extensive studies on the secrecy capacity
of different wiretap models as well as schemes that achieve the secrecy capacity (see [3] and [4]
for a comprehensive treatment on this subject).
Motivated by contemporary practical applications that often use short packets (e.g., smart
metering and traffic safety), there is considerable interest in investigating the backoff from
(secrecy) capacity incurred by coding at a finite blocklength [5]–[7]. In this paper, we study
the maximal secret communication rate R∗(n, , δ) for a given blocklength n, error probability ,
and information leakage δ, over wiretap channels. An exact characterization of this fundamental
quantity is computationally impossible for most wiretap channels of interest; instead, the aim
of this paper is to develop tight upper and lower bounds as well as accurate approximations.
Throughout this paper, the information leakage to the eavesdropper is measured by the total
variation distance (between proper distributions). More specifically, we consider two secrecy
metrics:
• Average secrecy: the total variation distance between the joint distribution PWZ of the secret
message W and the eavesdropper’s observation Z, and an ideal distribution in which W is
uniformly distributed and is independent of Z.
• Maximum secrecy: the maximum total variation distance between PZ|W=m and PZ , maxi-
mized over all messages m in the message set.
As we shall see in Section II, the latter is equivalent to distinguishing security and semantic
security [8], [9], which are two secrecy metrics widely accepted in the cryptography literature.
Prior work: Hayashi [10] established general achievability bounds using the channel resolv-
ability technique [11] (a.k.a. soft-covering [12]) and studied the secrecy exponent (i.e., the
exponential decreasing rate of the information leakage) for a fixed communication rate. Later,
he improved the secrecy exponent by leveraging the privacy amplification technique [13]. For
the setting of fixed  and δ and n→∞, Yassaee et al. [14] derived an achievability bound on
the second-order coding rate [6] (also known as dispersion [5]) by using the output statistics of
random binning, which improves an earlier result by Tan [15]. Achievability bounds for wiretap
channels with other secrecy metrics can be found in [16]–[19]. On the converse side, Tyagi and
Watanabe proposed a one-shot converse bound for the problem of secret key agreement [20],
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3which exploits binary hypothesis testing. Building upon the technique in [20], Hayashi et al. [21]
established a converse bound for wiretap channels, which leads to the strong converse for the
degraded case. This result strengthens a previous strong converse established by Tan and Bloch
using the information spectrum method [22].
Contributions: In this paper, we develop new achievability and converse bounds on the
maximal secrecy rate R∗(n, , δ) for general wiretap channels. Our achievability bounds are based
on two new privacy amplification results, which yield secrecy codes that satisfy, respectively,
the average and maximum secrecy constraints. These bounds are expressed in terms of the Eγ
metric [23], and establish a nice connection between two popular tools used in the achievability
proofs of information-theoretic security—privacy amplification and channel resolvability. Our
converse bound is motivated by the secret-key-agreement converse in [20] and the meta-converse
in [5]. It relates the error probability and the information leakage of a secrecy code to the error
probability of a binary hypothesis testing, and relies on a test that is tailored to the wiretap
channel. Both our achievability and converse bounds are uniformly tighter than the best existing
bounds (to the best of our knowledge).
By analyzing the behavior of our bounds in the regime of fixed  and δ and n → ∞, we
obtain upper and lower bounds on the second-order coding rate of discrete-memoryless wiretap
channels (DM-WTCs) and Gaussian wiretap channels. More specifically, we show that
CS −
√
V1
n
Q−1()−
√
V2
n
Q−1(δ) / R∗(n, , δ) / CS −
√
V3
n
Q−1(+ δ) (1)
where CS is the secrecy capacity, and V1, V2, and V3 are constants that depend on the stochastic
variations of the legitimate and the eavesdropper’s channel. This result holds under both the
average secrecy and the maximum secrecy constraint. Furthermore, the achievable second-order
rate in (1) improves on the ones derived in [14] and [15].
Bridging the gap between the upper and lower bounds in (1) for general wiretap channels seems
very difficult. This can be done, however, for the class of semi-deterministic wiretap channels, in
which the channel between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver is deterministic, while that
between the transmitter and the eavesdropper is a discrete memoryless channel (DMC). Indeed,
for semi-deterministic wiretap channels both the achievability and the converse bounds in (1)
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4can be tightened, which yields the following asymptotic expansion for R∗(n, , δ):
R∗(n, , δ) = CS −
√
VS
n
Q−1
(
δ
1− 
)
+O
(
log n
n
)
(2)
for every  and δ such that  + δ < 1. Here, VS is the conditional variance of an appropriate
information density term. The key idea behind the proof of (2) is to understand the optimal
tradeoff between reliability and secrecy. While it is possible to trade reliability for secrecy for
a general wiretap channel, the deterministic nature of the semi-deterministic wiretap channel
makes it also possible to trade secrecy for reliability (through additional privacy amplification).
Notation: The cardinality of a finite set A is denoted by |A|, and the uniform distribution
over A is designated as QunifA . For an input distribution PX and a random transformation PY |X ,
we let PY |X ◦ PX denote the marginal distribution of PXPY |X on Y . If PX = QunifC for some
finite set C ⊂ X , then we write PY |C , PY |X ◦QunifC . We shall consider the following “metrics”
between two probability measures P and Q on a sigma-algebra F of subsets of the set A:
• `p distance,1 p ∈ {1, 2}
‖P −Q‖p ,
(∑
x∈A
|P (x)−Q(x)|p
)1/p
(3)
• Total variation distance
d(P,Q) , sup
E∈F
|P (E)−Q(E)| (4)
=
1
2
‖P −Q‖1 (5)
• Eγ metric [23]
Eγ(P,Q) , P
[
dP
dQ
≥ γ
]
− γQ
[
dP
dQ
≥ γ
]
(6)
= sup
E∈F
{
P [E ]− γQ[E ]} (7)
with the understanding dP/dQ = +∞ in the singular set if P is not absolutely continuous
with respect to Q
• Neyman-Pearson β function
βα(P,Q) , min
∫
PT |X(1 |x)Q(dx) (8)
1For notational convenience, we write summation over A. However, our bounds hold for arbitrary probability spaces, unless
otherwise specified.
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5where the minimum is over all random transformations PT |X : A 7→ {0, 1} satisfying∫
PT |X(1 |x)P (dx) ≥ α. (9)
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider the wiretap channel (WTC) model (X , PY Z |X ,Y × Z) with transmitter X ,
legitimate receiver Y and eavesdropper Z introduced by Wyner [1]. The transmitter wishes
to communicate a message W ∈ M , {1, ...,M} to the receiver while keeping it secret from
the eavesdropper. We first introduce the secrecy metrics used in this paper.
A. Secrecy Metrics
A secrecy metric measures the statistical independence between the message W and the
eavesdropper’s observation Z. In this paper, we consider two secrecy metrics:
• Average total variation secrecy:
S(W |Z) , d(PWZ , QunifM PZ). (10)
Following [24, Eq. 7] and [25, p. 400], we shall also refer to S(W |Z) as the security index
of W against Z.
• Maximum total variation secrecy:
Smax(W |Z) , max
m∈M
d(PZ|W=m, QZ) (11)
where QZ , PZ|W ◦QunifM .
To the best of our knowledge, the maximum total variation secrecy has not been used in the
literature. However, as we shall show in Theorem 1 below, it is equivalent to distinguishing
security and to semantic security [8], [9], which are secrecy metrics widely accepted in the
cryptography literature. Formally, the distinguishing security metric is defined as
DS(W |Z) , max
m0,m1∈M
d(PZ|W=m0 , PZ|W=m1). (12)
In words, DS(W |Z) measures the (maximum) distinguishability of two messages m0 and m1.
And the semantic security metric is defined as
SS(W |Z) , sup
PW ,f,g
(
P[f(W ) = g(Z)]− sup
S
P[S = f(W )]
)
. (13)
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6Here, the outer supremum is over all probability distributions PW of the message W , and
(possibly randomized) functions f : M → A and g : Z → A, where the cardinality of
the common co-domain of f and g is unrestricted. The inner supremum is over all random
simulators S (i.e., random variables) supported on A that is independent of f(W ). The first
probability term measures the probability of success of the eavesdropper who tries to guess a
function f of the message W upon observing Z. The second probability term is the probability
of success of the eavesdropper before observing Z.
Theorem 1: For every transition probability distribution PZ|W :M→ Z , we have
SS(W |Z) ≤ Smax(W |Z) ≤ DS(W |Z) ≤ 2SS(W |Z) ≤ 2Smax(W |Z). (14)
Proof: The following relation between distinguishing security and semantic security was
established in [8]:
SS(W |Z) ≤ DS(W |Z) ≤ 2SS(W |Z). (15)
To conclude (14), it remains to show that
Smax(W |Z) ≤ DS(W |Z) (16)
and that
SS(W |Z) ≤ Smax(W |Z). (17)
The inequality (16) can be established as follows:
DS(W |Z) = max
m0,m1∈M
d(PZ|W=m0 , PZ|W=m1) (18)
≥ max
m0∈M
1
M
∑
m∈M
d(PZ|W=m0 , PZ|W=m) (19)
≥ max
m0∈M
d(PZ|W=m0 , PZ|W ◦QunifM ) (20)
= Smax(W |Z). (21)
Here, (20) follows because from Jensen’s inequality and because the total variation distance
d(P,Q) is convex in Q.
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7To prove (17), we observe that (recall that QZ , PZ|W ◦QunifM )
SS(W |Z) ≤ sup
PW ,f,g
(
PWZ [f(W ) = g(Z)]− (PWQZ)[g(Z) = f(W )]
)
(22)
≤ sup
PW
d(PWZ , PWQZ) (23)
= sup
m∈M
d(PZ|W=m, QZ) (24)
= Smax(W |Z). (25)
Here, (22) follows because under PWQZ , the random variables g(Z) and f(W ) are inde-
pendent; (23) follows from the definition (4); and (24) follows because the mapping PW 7→
d(PWZ , PWQZ) is linear.
B. Secrecy Codes
We next introduce the notion of secrecy codes for a wiretap channel. An (M, , δ)avg secrecy
code for the wiretap channel PY Z|X consists of
• a message W which is distributed on the message set M = {1, . . . ,M},
• a randomized encoder that generates a codeword X(m), m ∈M, according to a conditional
probability distribution PX |W=m, and
• a decoder g : Y →M that assigns an estimate Wˆ to each received signal Y ∈ Y .
The encoder and decoder satisfy the average error probability constraint
P[g(Y ) 6= W ] ≤  (26)
and the average total variation secrecy constraint
S(W |Z) ≤ δ. (27)
Remark 1: Note that in the definition of average secrecy code above, we do not require the
message W to be uniformly distributed over M. However, the codes used in our achievability
bounds satisfy this additional constraint. Our converse bounds hold regardless of whether the
message is uniformly distributed or not.
An (M, , δ)max secrecy code is defined similarly except that (26) is replaced by the maximum
error probability constraint
max
m∈M
PY |W=m[g(Y ) 6= m] ≤  (28)
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8and that (27) is replaced by the maximum total variation secrecy constraint
Smax(W |Z) ≤ δ. (29)
An (M, , δ)avg secrecy code for the channel PY nZn |Xn will be called an (n,M, , δ)avg secrecy
code. Furthermore, the maximal secrecy rate (average probability of error and average secrecy)
is defined as
R∗avg(n, , δ) , max
{
logM
n
: ∃ (n,M, , δ)avg secrecy code
}
. (30)
The maximal secrecy rate (maximum probability of error and maximum secrecy) R∗max(n, , δ)
can be defined analogously. By definition, we have
R∗max(n, , δ) ≤ R∗avg(n, , δ). (31)
III. BOUNDS ON THE SECRECY RATE
A. Privacy Amplification
Our achievability bounds rely on the privacy amplification technique. Privacy amplification is
a method of distilling secret information from a random source that is only partially secret [26].
More specifically, let Alice and Bob be given a random variable X ∈ X , such as a random key,
which is correlated with an eavesdropper Eve’s observation Z. Alice and Bob wish to publicly
choose a (hash) function g : X → K with |K| < |X | such that g(X) is almost independent of
Eve’s observation Z, and that the resulting random variable g(X) is approximately uniformly
distributed over K. In this section, we establish two privacy amplification results that will be
used to prove achievability bounds for wiretap channels.
Our first result refines the existing privacy amplification results in the literature.
Lemma 2: Let X , K be finite sets, and Z be an arbitrary set. Let PXZ be a probability
distribution on X × Z . Then,
1) For every γ > 0 and every probability distribution QZ supported on Z , there exists a
function g : X → K such that
S(g(X)|Z) ≤ Eγ(PXZ , QunifX QZ) +
1
2
√
γ
L
E
[
exp
(−∣∣ı(X;Z)− log γ∣∣)] (32)
where L , |X |/|K|,
ı(x; z) , log dPXZ
d(QunifX QZ)
(x, z) (33)
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9and the expectation in (32) is taken with respect to (X,Z) ∼ PXZ .
2) If in addition L ∈ N and PX = QunifX , then there exists a function g(·) that satisfies (32)
and that g(X) is uniformly distributed over K.
Proof: The proof is based on random hashing. Similar to a random coding argument, the
idea is to show that the average secrecy index of a properly chosen random hash function G is
upper-bounded by (32). See Appendix I for the proof.
Remark 2: The bound [27, Cor. 5.6.1] can be obtained from (32) by upper-bounding the
expectation term on the right-hand side (RHS) of (32) by 1 and by using [28, Lem. 19]. This
implies that [27, Cor. 5.6.1] is weaker than Lemma 2. Similarly, the bounds in [13, Th. 1] and [29,
Th. 6] can also be obtained by weakening (32), and are therefore weaker than Lemma 2.
Remark 3: The bound (32) can be slightly improved if PXZ admits additional (symmetry)
structures; see Theorem 18 for the case in which PZ|X is the channel law of a binary symmetric
channel.
Note that, the security index S(g(X)|Z) measures the average total variation distance between
PZ|g−1(K) and PZ for the random variable K = g(X). The next result shows that there exists a
hash function g such that the maximum total variation secrecy Smax(g(X)|PZ) is very close to the
average. Its proof relies on Hoeffding’s reduction argument for sample without replacement [30]
and on McDiarmid’s inequality (also known as bounded difference inequality) [31].
Lemma 3: Let X and K be finite sets satisfying L , |X |/|K| ∈ N, and let Z be an arbitrary
set. Let PX = QunifX be the uniform distribution over X , and let PZ = PZ|X ◦ PX . Let G be
the set of all functions g : X → K that satisfy |g−1(k)| = L, ∀k ∈ K, and let G be uniformly
distributed over G. Then, we have
P
[
max
k∈K
d(PZ|G−1(k), PZ) ≥ r + µ
]
≤ |K|e−2Lr2 (34)
where
µ , E
[
d(PZ|A, PZ)
]
(35)
withA = {X¯1, . . . , X¯L} being a random codebook whose codewords are i.i.d. and PX-distributed.
Consequently, there exists a function g ∈ G such that
max
k∈K
d(PZ|g−1(k), PZ) ≤ µ+
√
log(|K|+ 1)
2L
. (36)
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Proof: See Appendix II.
Remark 4: In the applications of Lemma 3, |K| and L are usually taken to be exponential
in the dimension n. In such cases, |K|e−2Lr2 vanishes double-exponentially fast in n. Such a
double-exponential convergence was first observed by Ahlswede and Csisza´r in the analysis of
random bits extractors [32] (see also [25, p. 404]), and more recently in the setting of channel
resolvability/soft-covering [33], [34].
Interestingly, Lemma 3 connects privacy amplification to channel resolvability [11]. Indeed,
given a probability distribution PX on X and a random transformation PZ|X : X → Z , the
channel resolvability problem aims to find a set A ⊂ X with cardinality |A| ≤ L that minimizes
the (total variation) distance between PZ|A and the target PZ , PZ|X ◦ PX . A good way to
find A is through random coding. Namely, we generate each element (i.e., codeword) in A
independently and identically according to PX . It turns out that the average total variation distance
E
[
d(PZ|A, PZ)
]
for the random codebook A is a tight upper bound on minA:|A|≤L d(PZ|A, PZ).
The next result shows that E
[
d(PZ | A, PZ)
]
admits an upper bound that is of the same form
as (32), which indicate that channel resolvability and privacy amplification are based on the
same probabilistic principle.
Lemma 4: Let X be a finite set, and let Z be an arbitrary set. Let PXZ be a probability
distribution supported on X ×Z such that PX(x) > 0 for every x ∈ X . Let A , {X1, . . . , XL}
be a random codebook whose codewords are independently and identically generated according
to PX . For every γ > 0, every probability distribution QZ supported on Z , we have
E
[
d(PZ|A, PZ)
] ≤ Eγ(PXZ , QunifX QZ) + 12
√
γ
L
E
[
exp(−|ı(X˜;Z)− log γ|)
]
(37)
where ı(·; ·) is defined in (33), and the expectation on the right-hand side of (37) is taken with
respect to (X˜, Z) ∼ QunifX PZ|X .
Proof: See Appendix III.
In this paper, we will only use privacy amplification to prove achievability bounds for the
wiretap channel. For completeness, though, we present a converse result for privacy amplification
below, which shows that the achievability bounds in Lemmas 2–4 are tight up to some nuisance
terms.
Lemma 5: Let X , Z , K, and PXZ be as defined in Lemma 2. Then, every function g : X → K
June 14, 2017 DRAFT
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satisfies
S(g(X)|Z) ≥ EL(PXZ , QunifX QZ). (38)
Proof: See Appendix IV.
As a corollary of Lemma 5, we obtain the following converse bound for channel resolvability.
Corollary 6: For every finite set C = {x1, ..., xL} ⊂ X , every PZ|X : X → Z , and every QZ ,
we have
d(PZ | C, QZ) ≥ EL(QunifC PZ |X , QunifC QZ). (39)
Proof: The proof follows by using Lemma 5 with X = C, K = {1}, PX = QunifC , and
g(·) ≡ 1.
B. Achievability Bound: Average Secrecy and Average Probability of Error
The privacy amplification lemmas developed in Section III-A allow us to convert an arbitrary
(nonsecret) channel code for the legitimate channel PY |X into a secrecy code with a guaranteed
secrecy performance. By combining the random coding union (RCU) bound [5, Th. 16] and the
dependence testing (DT) bound [5, Th. 17, Eq. (79)] for channel coding with Lemma 2, we
obtain the following achievability bound for the wiretap channel.
Theorem 7: Let PX be a probability distribution supported on A ⊂ X . For every L ∈ N, every
γ > 0, and every QZ , there exists an (M, , δ)avg code with a uniformly distributed message for
the wiretap channel (X , PY Z |X ,Y × Z) that satisfies
δ ≤ sup
x∈A
Eγ(PZ|X=x, QZ) + sup
x∈A
1
2
√
γ
L
EPZ|X=x
[
exp
(−∣∣ı(x;Z)− log γ∣∣)] (40)
and that
 ≤ min
{
RCU(ML), DT
(ML− 1
2
)}
. (41)
Here, ı(·; ·) is defined in (33),
RCU(a) , E
[
min{1, (a− 1)P[i(X¯;Y ) ≥ i(X;Y ) |X, Y ]}] (42)
where i(x; y) , log dPY |X(y|x)
dPY (y)
, PXY X¯(x, y, x¯) = PX(x)PY |X(y|x)PX(x¯), and
DT(a) , 1− Ea(PXY , PXPY ). (43)
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Proof: By the RCU bound [5, Th. 16] and the DT bound [5, Th. 17 and Eq. (79)], there
exists a code C = {x1, . . . , xLM} whose error probability over the legitimate channel PY |X
satisfies (41). Next, we construct a secrecy code for the wiretap channel PY Z|X from this code
using Lemma 2.
Let X ∼ QunifC . Then, by Lemma 2, there exists a function g : C → M such that g(X) is
uniformly distributed over M, and that for every γ > 0 and every QZ
S(g(X)|Z) ≤ Eγ(QunifC PZ|X , QunifC QZ)
+
1
2
√
γ
L
EQunifC PZ|X
[
exp
(−|ı(X;Z)− log γ|)] (44)
≤ sup
x∈A
Eγ(PZ|X=x, QZ)
+ sup
x∈A
1
2
√
γ
L
EPZ|X=x
[
exp
(−∣∣ı(x;Z)− log γ∣∣)]. (45)
Here, the last step follows because the map PX 7→ Eγ(PXZ , PXQZ) is linear and because C ⊂ A.
Consider now a secrecy code with message W = g(X) and with a random encoder PX|W=m =
Qunifg−1(m). In words, for each message m ∈ M, the encoder PW |X picks a codeword from the
set g−1(m) uniformly at random. The decoder first decodes the codeword Xˆ and then outputs
Wˆ = g(Xˆ). By construction, the message W of the code is uniformly distributed, and the
average error probability is upper-bounded by (41), i.e.,
P[W 6= Wˆ ] ≤ P[X 6= Xˆ] ≤ min
{
RCU(ML), DT
(ML− 1
2
)}
. (46)
Furthermore, we have
S(W |Z) = S(g(X)|Z). (47)
From (45) and (47), we conclude that the resulting code also satisfies the secrecy condition (40).
Hence, it is an (M, , δ)avg secrecy code.
C. Achievability Bounds: Maximum Secrecy and Maximum Probability of Error
By a standard expurgation argument applied to the RCU bound [5, Th. 16], we observe that
for the legitimate channel PY |X , there exists a code with ML codewords whose maximum error
probability is upper-bounded by (see [5, Eq. (220)])
RCU,max(ML) , inf
τ∈(0,1)
τ−1
RCU((1− τ)ML)
τ
. (48)
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Combining Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 with the achievability bounds in [5, Th. 21] and (48) for
maximum error probability constrained channel codes, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 8: Let PX be a probability distribution supported on A ⊂ X . For every L ∈ N,
every γ > 0, and every QZ , there exists an (M, , δ)max secrecy code for the wiretap channel
(X , PY Z |X ,Y × Z) that satisfies
δ ≤ sup
x∈A
Eγ(PZ|X=x, QZ) +
√
log(M + 1)
2L
+ sup
x∈A
1
2
√
γ
L
EPZ|X=x
[
exp
(−∣∣ı(x;Z)− log γ∣∣)] (49)
and that
 ≤ min{DT,max
(
ML− 1), RCU,max(ML)}. (50)
Here, ı(·; ·) is defined in (33), and
DT,max(a) , inf
γ≥0
{
P[i(X;Y ) ≤ log γ] + a sup
x∈A
P[i(x;Y ) ≥ log γ]
}
(51)
with i(x; y) , log dPY |X(y|x)
dPY (y)
and PXY (x, y) = PX(x)PY |X(y|x).
In the proof of Theorem 8, we apply the privacy amplification lemma (Lemma 3) to a maximum
error probability constrained code C for the legitimate channel. Since each codeword of C has
a maximum error probability upper-bounded by  over PY |X , the maximum error probability
of the resulting secrecy code is also upper-bounded by . The remaining part of the proof is
analogous to the proof of Theorem 7 and is omitted.
An alternative bound can be obtained by using the privacy amplification technique on an aver-
age error probability constrained code for the legitimate channel, and by using the concentration
of measure technique employed in the proof of Lemma 3.
Theorem 9: Let PX be a probability distribution supported on A ⊂ X . For every L ∈ N, every
γ > 0, and every QZ , there exists an (M, , δ)max code for the wiretap channel (X , PY Z |X ,Y×Z)
that satisfies
δ ≤ sup
x∈A
Eγ(PZ|X=x, QZ) +
√
log(2M + 1)
2L
+ sup
x∈A
1
2
√
γ
L
EPZ|X=x
[
exp
(−∣∣ı(x;Z)− log γ∣∣)] (52)
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and that
 ≤ min
{
RCU(ML), DT
(ML− 1
2
)}
+
√
log(2M + 1)
2L
. (53)
Here, ı(·; ·), RCU(·), and DT are defined in (33), (42), and (43), respectively.
Proof: As shown in the proof of Theorem 7, there exists a code C = {x1, . . . , xLM} whose
average error probability 0 on the channel PY |X satisfies (41). Next, we construct a secrecy
code for the wiretap channel PY Z|X from this code C using privacy amplification.
Let X ∼ PX = QunifC , and let PZ = PZ|X◦PX . Let G be the set of all functions g : C →M that
satisfy |g−1(m)| = L for every m ∈M, and let G be uniformly distributed over G. Furthermore,
let Pe(x), x ∈ C, be the error probability of the codeword x over the legitimate channel PY |X .
By definition, we have
EX∼QunifC [Pe(X)] = 0. (54)
The key step of the proof is to establish the following bound:
P
[
max
m∈M
d(PZ|G−1(m), PZ) ≥ r + µ ∪ max
m∈M
EX∼Qunif
G−1(m)
[Pe(X)] ≥ r + 0
]
≤ 2Me−2Lr2 (55)
where µ is defined in (35), and r is an arbitrary positive constant. Setting r =
√
log(2M+1)
2L
in (55), we see that the RHS of (55) is strictly less than 1. This in turn implies that there exists
a hash function g : C →M such that
max
m∈M
d(PZ|g−1(m), PZ) ≤
√
log(2M + 1)
2L
+ µ (56)
and
max
m∈M
EX∼Qunif
g−1(m)
[Pe(X)] ≤
√
log(2M + 1)
2L
+ 0 (57)
≤
√
log(2M + 1)
2L
+ min
{
RCU(ML), DT
(ML− 1
2
)}
. (58)
Furthermore, the RHS of (56) is upper-bounded by the expression on the RHS of (52) according
to Lemma 4.
Consider now a secrecy code with message W = g(X) and with a random encoder PX|W=m =
Qunifg−1(m). The decoder first decodes the codeword Xˆ and then set Wˆ = g(Xˆ). By construction,
we have
d(PZ|W=m, PZ) = d(PZ|g−1(m), PZ), ∀m ∈M. (59)
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Furthermore, the error probability of a message m ∈M is equal to
Pe(m) = EX∼PX|W=m [Pe(X)] = EX∼Qunif
g−1(m)
[Pe(X)] . (60)
Therefore, the maximum error probability and maximum information leakage of the resulting
secrecy code satisfy the bounds specified in (53) and (52).
To conclude the proof, it remains to show (55). By the union bound, we have
P
[
max
m∈M
d(PZ|G−1(m), PZ) ≥ r + µ ∪ max
m∈M
EX∼Qunif
G−1(m)
[Pe(X)] ≥ r + 0
]
≤ P
[
max
m∈M
d(PZ|G−1(m), PZ) ≥ r + µ
]
+MP[EX∼Qunif
G−1(1)
[Pe(X)] ≥ r + 0] (61)
≤Me−2Lr2 +MP[EX∼Qunif
G−1(1)
[Pe(X)] ≥ r + 0]. (62)
Here, (62) follows from Lemma 3. Note that
EX∼Qunif
G−1(1)
[Pe(X)]
d
=
1
L
L∑
i=1
Pe(Xi) (63)
where X1, ..., XL are random samples without replacement from C, and d= denotes equality in
distribution. Since 0 ≤ Pe(Xi) ≤ 1 almost surely, and since E[Pe(Xi)] = 0, we can invoke
Hoeffding’s inequality for samples without replacement [30] and obtain
P
[
EX∼Qunif
G−1(1)
[Pe(X)] ≥ r + 0
]
≤ e−2Lr2 . (64)
Substituting (64) into (62) we conclude (55).
D. Achievability: Trading Reliability for Secrecy
Our next result shows that one can trade reliability for secrecy for a wiretap channel.
Theorem 10: Consider a wiretap channel PY Z|X . Every (M, 0, δ0)max (resp. (M, 0, δ0)avg)
secrecy code for PY Z|X can be converted to an (M, , δ)max (resp. (M, , δ)avg) secrecy code
with  > 0 and δ = δ0(1− )/(1− 0). Consequently,
R∗max(n, 0, δ0) ≤ R∗max
(
n, ,
δ0(1− )
1− 0
)
(65)
R∗avg(n, 0, δ0) ≤ R∗avg
(
n, ,
δ0(1− )
1− 0
)
. (66)
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Proof: Choose an arbitrary (M, 0, δ0)max secrecy code C. Let P CX|W be the stochastic encoder
of this code, and let P CX be the empirical output distribution of the encoder for a uniformly
distributed message. We construct a new secrecy code C˜ from C by using the following encoder
P C˜X|W = (1− p)P CX|W + pP CX (67)
where
p =
− 0
1− 0 . (68)
The decoder of C˜ is chosen to be the same as that of C. We shall prove that the maximum error
probability of the new code C˜ is upper-bounded by , and its maximum information leakage
is upper-bounded by δ. Consequently, C˜ is an (M, , δ)max code, from which the claim of the
theorem follows.
Let Dm be the decoding region corresponding to the message m. The error probability Pe,m(C˜)
of C˜ for the message m can be evaluated as follows:
Pe,m(C˜) = 1−
(
PY n|Xn ◦ P C˜Xn|W=m
)
[Dm] (69)
= 1− (1− p)0 − p
(
PY n|Xn ◦ P CXn
)
[Dm]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(70)
≤  (71)
where (70) follows from (67) and because C has error probability 0.
Let P CZ and P
C˜
Z be the empirical output distributions of C and C˜ over the channel PZ|X ,
respectively. For every message m ∈M, we have
d
(
P C˜Z|W=m, P
C˜
Z
)
= d
(
P C˜Z|W=m, P
C
Z
)
(72)
= d
(
PZ|X ◦
(
(1− p)P CX|W=m + pP CX
)
, P CZ
)
(73)
= (1− p)d(P CZ|W=m, P CZ) (74)
≤ δ0(1− )
1− 0 = δ. (75)
Here, (72) follows because P CZ = P
C˜
Z , (73) follows from (67), and (75) follows because, by
definition, d(P CZ|W=m, P
C
Z) ≤ δ0 for every m ∈ M. The result for average probability of error
and average secrecy constraint can be proved similarly.
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E. Converse Bounds
We first present a general converse bound.
Theorem 11: Every (M, , δ)avg secrecy code satisfies
M ≤ sup
PX|W
inf
0<τ<1−δ
inf
QY
βδ+τ (PWZ , Q
unif
M PZ)
τβ1−(PWY , QunifM QY )
(76)
where PW denotes the distribution of the message (not necessarily uniformly distributed), and PY
and PZ are the marginal distributions of the Markov chains W → X → Y and W → X → Z,
respectively.
Proof: By the meta-converse bound for non-equiprobable messages [35], every (M, , δ)avg
secrecy code satisfies
M ≤ inf
QY
1
β1−(PWY , QunifX QY )
. (77)
Furthermore, by the secrecy constraint,
δ ≥ d(PWZ , QunifM PZ) ≥ δ + τ − βδ+τ (PWZ , QunifM PZ) (78)
where the last step follows from (4). Rearranging the terms in (78), we conclude that
βδ+τ (PWZ , Q
unif
M PZ) ≥ τ. (79)
Combining (79) with (77), and optimizing the resulting bound over all stochastic encoders PX|W ,
we obtain (76).
The bound (76) is in general difficult to compute or analyze. Next, we prove a converse
bound, which is motivated by the converse in [20] for secret key generation. This bound is both
numerically and analytically tractable.
Theorem 12: Let QY |Z : Y → Z be an arbitrary random transformation. Then, every (M, , δ)avg
secrecy code for the wiretap channel (X , PY Z|X ,Y × Z) satisfies
M ≤ inf
τ∈(0,1−−δ)
τ + δ
τβ1−−δ−τ (PXY Z , PXZQY |Z)
(80)
where PXY Z denotes the distribution induced by the code.
Remark 5: Using the result in [20], Hayashi, Tyagi, and Watanabe recently derived the fol-
lowing converse bound [21] (for the case of uniformly distributed message):
M ≤ inf
τ∈(0,1−−δ)
1
τ 2β1−−δ−τ (PXY Z , PXZQY |Z)
. (81)
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P :W → X → (Y, Z)
Wˆ
↘
QY |Z
Q :W → X → Z −→ Y → Wˆ
Fig. 1. A graphical illustration of the probability distributions PWXYZWˆ and QWXYZWˆ .
Our bound is stronger than (81) since (τ + δ)/τ < 1/τ 2.
Proof: Fix an arbitrary (M, , δ)avg secrecy code and let PWXY ZWˆ , PWPX|WPY Z|XPWˆ |Y
be the joint distribution induced by the code. And let QWXY ZWˆ , PWPX|WPZ|XQY |ZPWˆ |Y
(see Fig. 1 for a graphical illustration). As in the meta-converse bound [5, Th. 26] and in [20],
the idea is to relate the error probability and secrecy index of the secrecy code to the binary
hypothesis testing between PWWˆZ and QWWˆZ through a suboptimal test. The following test
PT |WWˆZ :M2 ×Z 7→ {0, 1} plays an prominent role in our proof:
T (m, mˆ, z) = 1
{
m = mˆ, PW |Z(m|z) ≤ 1/(ηM)
}
(82)
where η ∈ (0, 1).
One the one hand, we have
QWWˆZ [T = 1]
=
∑
m,mˆ,z
QZWˆ (z, mˆ)PW |Z(m|z)
·1{m = mˆ, PW |Z(m|z) ≤ 1/(Mη)} (83)
≤ 1
Mη
∑
m,z
QZWˆ (z,m)1
{
PW |Z(m|z) ≤ 1/(Mη)
}
(84)
≤ 1
Mη
. (85)
One the other hand, by (26), the probability PWWˆZ [T = 1] can be lower-bounded as
PWWˆZ [T = 1] ≥ 1− − PWZ [PW |Z(W |Z) ≥ 1/(Mη)]. (86)
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To further lower-bound the RHS of (86), we observe that
δ ≥ d(PWZ , QunifM PZ) (87)
≥ PWZ [PW |Z(W |Z) ≥ 1/(Mη)]
−QunifM PZ [PW |Z(W |Z) ≥ 1/(Mη)] (88)
and that
PWZ [PW |Z(W |Z) ≥ 1/(Mη)]
≥ 1
η
QunifM PZ [PW |Z(W |Z) ≥ 1/(Mη)]. (89)
Here, (89) follows from a standard change of measure argument. Combining (88) and (89), we
obtain
PWZ [PW |Z(W |Z) ≥ 1/(Mη)] ≤ δ
1− η . (90)
Substituting (90) into (86), and using (85), we conclude that
β1−−δ/(1−η)(PWWˆZ , QWWˆZ) ≤
1
Mη
. (91)
The final bound (80) follows by rearranging the terms in (91), by the change of variable τ =
δ/(1− η)− δ, and by observing that
βα(PWWˆZ , QWWˆZ) ≥ βα(PXY Z , PXZQY |Z) (92)
which follows from the data-processing inequality for βα.
IV. BOUNDS ON THE SECOND-ORDER SECRECY RATE
A. DM-WTC
We shall use the following notation:
I(PX , PY |X) , I(X;Y ) (93)
V (PX , PY |X) ,
∑
x∈X
PX(x)
(∑
y∈Y
PY |X(y|x) log2
PY |X(y|x)
PY (y)
− D(PY |X=x‖PY )2
)
(94)
I˜(PX , PY Z|X) , I(X;Y |Z) (95)
V˜ (PX , PY Z|X) ,
∑
x∈X
PX(x)
(∑
y,z
PZY |X(y, z|x) log2
PY Z|X(y, z|x)
PZ|X(z|x)PY |Z(y|z)
−D(PY Z|X=x‖PY |ZPZ|X=x)2
)
. (96)
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The secrecy capacity of a general DM-WTC is given by [2]
CS = max
PVX
(
I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)
)
(97)
where the maximization is over all probability distributions PV X for which V → X → Y Z
form a Markov chain. For simplicity, we shall assume that there exists a unique probability
distribution P ∗V X = P
∗
V P
∗
X|V that achieves the maximum in (97). Note that if the eavesdropper’s
channel PZ|X is less capable than the legitimate channel PY |X , then the secrecy capacity reduces
to [4, Sec. 3.5.1]
CS = max
PX
(
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)
)
. (98)
The auxiliary random variable V makes the evaluation of (97) difficult. An upper bound
on (97) is given by [21]
CS ≤ CuS , max
PX
I(X;Y |Z). (99)
For simplicity, we shall also assume that there exists a unique probability distribution P˜ ∗X that
attains the maximum in (99), and that V˜ (P˜ ∗X , PY Z|X) > 0. Note that, the bound (99) is tight
(i.e., CS = CuS ) if the wiretap channel is physically degraded [4, Def. 3.8].
Theorem 13: Consider a DM-WTC PY Z|X . If + δ < 1, then we have
R∗max(n, , δ) ≥ CS −
√
V1
n
Q−1()−
√
V2
n
Q−1(δ) +O
(
log n
n
)
(100)
and
R∗avg(n, , δ) ≤ CuS −
√
Vc
n
Q−1(+ δ) +O
(
log n
n
)
. (101)
Here, Q−1(·) is the inverse of the Gaussian Q-function Q(x) , ∫∞
x
1√
2pi
e−t
2/2dt and
V1 , V (P ∗V , PY |X ◦ P ∗X|V ) (102)
V2 , V (P ∗V , PZ|X ◦ P ∗X|V ) (103)
Vc , V˜ (P˜ ∗X , PY Z|X). (104)
If + δ > 1, then
R∗max(n, , δ) ≥ Clegit −
√
Vlegit
n
Q−1
(
+ δ − 1
δ
)
+O
(
log n
n
)
(105)
where Clegit and Vlegit denote the capacity and channel dispersion of the legitimate channel.
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Proof: See Appendix V.
A few remarks are in order.
• As implied by (105), the strong converse does not hold if δ +  > 1.
• It is possible to slightly improve the achievability bound (100) by using Theorem 10; see
Section V-C.
• By Theorem 1, every achievability bound on R∗max(n, , δ) can be converted to achievability
bounds on semantic security and distinguishing security. In particular, the bound (100)
implies the semantic security capacity of wiretap channels recently studied in [36] and [37].
The achievability bound (100) is tighter than the achievable second-order coding rate in [14]
obtained by using output statistics of random binning, and is tighter than the one in [15] obtained
via channel resolvability. The latter two approaches use a random coding argument and bound the
average error probability and average information leakage averaged over all random codebooks
separately. They then invoke Markov’s inequality to show the existence of a code that satisfies
simultaneously the reliability and secrecy constraint. The use of Markov’s inequality introduces
a penalty to the second-order coding rate, which corresponds to the gap between (100) and [14,
Eq. (23)]. In contrast, our result shows that every code that satisfies the reliability constraint can
be modified to satisfy the secrecy constraint, thereby avoiding the use of Markov’s inequality.
However, this does not mean that channel resolvability based approaches have worse asymptotic
performance than the privacy amplification based approach adopted in this paper. Indeed, the
same bound (100) can be proved by using the stronger channel resolvability result developed
in [34], which shows that the random coding procedure in channel resolvability succeeds with
a probability double-exponentially close to unity.
B. Gaussian wiretap channel
Consider the Gaussian wiretap channel
Yi = Xi + Ui, Zi = Xi + U˜i, i = 1, . . . , n (106)
where {Ui} are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) N (0, N1) random variables, and
{U˜i} are i.i.d. N (0, N2) random variables. Without loss of generality, we assume that N2 > N1
(otherwise the secrecy capacity is zero). Furthermore, we assume that each codeword xn satisfies
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the power constraint
‖xn‖2 ≤ nP. (107)
Theorem 14: For the Gaussian wiretap channel (106), we have
R∗max(n, , δ) ≥ CS −
√
V1
n
Q−1()−
√
V2
n
Q−1(δ) +O
(
log n
n
)
(108)
and
R∗avg(n, , δ) ≤ CS −
√
Vc
n
Q−1(+ δ) +O
(
log n
n
)
(109)
where
CS =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
N1
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
P
N2
)
(110)
Vi =
log2 e
2
P 2 + 2PNi
(P +Ni)2
, i ∈ {1, 2} (111)
Vc = V1 + V2 − PN1
P +N1
(
1
N2
+
1
P +N2
)
log2 e. (112)
Proof: See Appendix VI.
C. Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, we compare the bounds proposed in this paper with existing bounds in [21]
and [29], and with the approximations provided in Theorem 14 for a Gaussian wiretap channel
(with the O(·) terms omitted). The results are shown in Fig. 2. The bound labeled by “Hayashi
et al.” is [21, Th. 6] (see also (81)), and the one labeled by “Watanabe-Hayashi” is obtained
by combining the privacy amplification bound [29, Cor. 2] with Shannon’s channel coding
achievability bound [38] (which is the tightest achievability bound for Gaussian channels [5,
Sec. III.J-4]).2
Several observations are in order. First of all, both our achievability and converse bounds are
uniformly better than the ones in [21] and [29]. Secondly, the expansions (108) and (109) provide
reasonable approximations for the bounds in Theorems 9 and 12. Last but not least, there is a
nontrivial gap between our achievability and converse bounds (which can also be inferred from
the approximations (108) and (109)).
2The numerical routine used to compute Shannon’s channel coding achievability bound is available at https://github.com/yp-
mit/spectre
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Fig. 2. Secrecy rate for the Gaussian wiretap channel with P/N1 = 3 dB, P/N2 = −3 dB,  = δ = 10−3.
To understand the causes of the gap between the upper and lower bound in Theorems 13
and 14, we note that our achievability schemes come with two limitations.
• In our achievability schemes, the secrecy and reliability constraints are treated separately. In
particular, the transmitter adds redundancy to the transmitted signals to guarantee reliability,
and uses (separated) randomness to derive secrecy. The amount of redundancy depends
on the quality of the legitimate channel and the error probability constraint, whereas the
amount of randomness depends on the quality of the eavesdropper’s channel and the secrecy
constraint. While separation-based schemes are secrecy-capacity-achieving, it is not clear
whether they are second-order optimal.3
• Assuming a separation-based structure, our achievability schemes further require the legit-
imate decoder to decode both the message and the randomness inserted by the transmitter.
It would be interesting to construct schemes that relax these requirements, and to see if such
schemes achieve better second-order secrecy rate.
3A similar phenomenon occurs in the joint source-channel coding setting. Recently, it was shown that separate source-channel
coding is first-order but not second-order optimal [39].
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V. SEMI-DETERMINISTIC WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we focus on a special class of wiretap channels known as semi-deterministic
DM-WTCs. More specifically, in a semi-deterministic DM-WTC PY Z|X : X → Y×Z , the output
of the legitimate channel is a deterministic function of the input, i.e., PY |X(y|x) = 1{y = f(x)}
for some deterministic function f , and the eavesdropper’s channel is a (noisy) DMC. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the function f is surjective. Note that, in general, a semi-
deterministic wiretap channel is not (stochastically) degraded.
The secrecy capacity of a semi-deterministic wiretap channel is given by [40]
CS = max
PX
H(Y |Z). (113)
This can be achieved by setting V = Y in the secrecy capacity formula (97). An alternative
expression for the secrecy capacity is given by
CS = max
PX
I(X;Y |Z). (114)
The equivalence between (113) and (114) follows because, for a semi-deterministic DM-WTC,
I(X;Y |Z)−H(Y |Z) = H(Y |X,Z) = 0. (115)
Throughout this section, we shall assume that there exists a unique input distribution P ∗X
that achieves the secrecy capacity (113). Let P ∗Y and P
∗
Z|Y denote the marginal and conditional
distributions of P ∗XPY Z|X . For semi-deterministic wiretap channels, the bounds in Theorem 13
match for the special case  = 0, which yields4
R∗i (n, 0, δ) = CS −
√
VS
n
Q−1(δ) +O
(
log n
n
)
, i ∈ {avg,max} (116)
where
VS , V (P ∗Y , P ∗Z|Y ). (117)
The main result of this section is a complete characterization of the second-order secrecy rate
of the semi-deterministic DM-WTC for arbitrary  and δ.
4Rigorously speaking, the bounds in Theorem 13 do not directly imply (116), since there it is required that  > 0 and that
the dispersion of the legitimate channel is nonzero. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to prove (116) using the same arguments as
in the proof of Theorem 13. We omit these mechanical details here.
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A. Nonasymptotic Converse Bound
We first give a nonasymptotic converse bound for semi-deterministic wiretap channels.
Theorem 15: Every (M, , δ)avg secrecy code for the semi-deterministic DM-WTC PY Z|X
satisfies
min
PX∈P(X )
min
QZ∈P(Z)
E |Y|
M(1−)
(PY Z|X ◦ PX , QunifY QZ) ≤
δ
1−  (118)
where QunifY is the uniform distribution over Y .
Remark 6: By the triangular inequality for Eγ(·, ·) [23, Eq. (21)], the function (PX , QZ) 7→
Eγ(PY Z|X ◦ PX , QunifY QZ) is continuous in the topology of total variation. Moreover, since the
probability simplexes P(X ) and P(Z) are compact, a minimizer for Eγ(PY Z|X ◦ PX , QunifY QZ)
exists.
Proof: Choose an arbitrary (M, , δ)avg secrecy code. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that the decoder at the legitimate receiver is deterministic, and that the error probability
constraint (26) holds with equality. Denote by Dm, m ∈M, the decoding region for message m.
By definition, we have
P[Y ∈ DW ] =
M∑
m=1
∑
y∈Y
PWY (m, y)1{y ∈ Dm} (119)
= 1− . (120)
Next, we derive a lower bound on the security index S(W |Z) = d(PWZ , QunifW PZ) by using a
suboptimal set E in (4). Let
P cX(x) ,
1
1− 
M∑
m=1
PWX(m,x)1{f(x) ∈ Dm} (121)
and let P cY Z , PY Z|X ◦ P cX . By (120), both P cX and P cY Z are probability distributions. Consider
the following subset of M×Z
E ,
{
(m, z) : max
y∈Dm
P cY Z
QunifY PZ
(y; z) ≥ γ
}
(122)
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where the threshold γ will be specified later. On the one hand, we have
PWZ [E ] = 1
M
M∑
m=1
∑
y∈Y
PWY (m, y)
·PZ|Y=y,W=m
[
max
y˜∈Dm
P cY Z
QunifY PZ
(y˜;Z) ≥ γ
]
(123)
≥
M∑
m=1
∑
y∈Dm
PWY (m, y)
·PZ|Y=y,W=m
[
P cY Z
QunifY PZ
(y;Z) ≥ γ
]
(124)
= (1− )P cY Z
[
P cY Z
QunifY PZ
(Y ;Z) ≥ γ
]
. (125)
On the other hand, we have
(QunifM PZ)[E ] =
1
M
M∑
m=1
PZ
[
max
y∈Dm
P cY Z
QunifY PZ
(y;Z) ≥ γ
]
(126)
≤ 1
M
M∑
m=1
∑
y∈Dm
PZ
[
P cY Z
QunifY PZ
(y;Z) ≥ γ
]
(127)
=
|Y|
M
(
QunifY PZ
)[ P cY Z
QunifY PZ
(Y ;Z) ≥ γ
]
(128)
where (127) follows from the union bound. Setting γ = |Y|/(M(1 − )), and using (6), (125),
and (128), we finally obtain
δ ≥ d(PWZ , PWPZ) (129)
≥ PWZ [E ]− (QunifM PZ)[E ] (130)
≥ (1− )P cY Z
[
log
P cY Z
QunifY PZ
(Y ;Z) ≥ γ
]
− |Y|
M
(
QunifY PZ
)[ P cY Z
QunifY PZ
(Y ;Z) ≥ γ
]
(131)
= (1− )E |Y|
M(1−)
(P cY Z , Q
unif
Y PZ) (132)
≥ (1− ) min
PX
min
QZ
E |Y|
M(1−)
(PY Z|X ◦ PX , QunifY QZ). (133)
This concludes the proof.
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B. Trading Secrecy for Reliability
In Section III-D, we have shown that one can trade reliability for secrecy for an arbitrary
wiretap channel. While the converse is not true in general, the following result shows that one
can trade secrecy for reliability for a semi-deterministic wiretap channel.
Theorem 16: Every (M, , δ)avg secrecy code for a semi-deterministic wiretap channel can be
converted to an (M ′, 0, δ′)avg secrecy code for the same channel, where M ′ ∈ N and
δ′ , δ
1−  +
1
2
√
M ′
M(1− ) . (134)
Consequently, we have
R∗avg(n, , δ) ≤ R∗avg
(
n, 0,
δ
1−  + τn
)
− 1
n
log(4τ 2n(1− )) (135)
where τn is an arbitrary positive constant that satisfies 4M(1− )τ 2n ∈ N.
Proof: Choose an arbitrary (M, , δ)avg secrecy code. Note that, by (132) in the proof of
Theorem 15, this code must satisfy
min
QZ
E |Y|
M(1−)
(PY Z|X ◦ P cX , QunifY QZ) ≤
δ
1−  (136)
where P cX was defined in (121). Let P
c
Y and P
c
X|Y be the marginal (conditional) distributions
of P cXPY |X . Then, using P
c
X|Y as a prefix to the channel PY Z|X , we obtain an auxiliary semi-
deterministic wiretap channel P c
Y Z|Yˆ : Y → Y ×Z:
Yˆ
P c
X|Y−→ X PY Z|X−→ (Y, Z). (137)
By construction, every secrecy code for the auxiliary channel P c
Y Z|Yˆ is also a secrecy code for
the original channel PY Z|X . Furthermore, P cY |Yˆ (y|yˆ) = 1{y = yˆ}.
Next, we construct a secrecy code for the auxiliary channel P c
Y Z|Yˆ as follows. Let M
′ ∈ N be
a positive integer. Using Lemma 2 on the joint distribution PY Z with γ = |Y|/(M(1− )), and
upper-bounding the expectation term on the RHS of (32) by 1, we conclude that there exists a
mapping g0 : Y → {1, . . . ,M ′} satisfying
S(g0(Y )|Z) ≤ min
QZ
E |Y|
M(1−)
(P cY Z , Q
unif
Y QZ) +
1
2
√
M ′
M(1− ) (138)
≤ δ
1−  +
1
2
√
M ′
M(1− ) = δ
′. (139)
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Let now the message W be distributed according to g(Yˆ ) where Yˆ ∼ P cY . For each message
m ∈ {1, . . . ,M ′}, the stochastic encoder PYˆ |W=m is chosen to be the conditional distribution
of Yˆ ∼ P cY given Yˆ ∈ g−1(m). Such a code has zero error over the legitimate channel since
the sets {g−1(m)} are disjoint. Furthermore, P c
Yˆ Z
(y, z) = P cY Z(y, z) for every (y, z) ∈ Y × Z .
Hence, we have
S(W |Z) = S(g0(Yˆ )|Z) = S(g0(Y )|Z) ≤ δ′. (140)
This concludes the first part of the theorem. The bound (135) follows by choosing M =
exp(nR∗avg(n, , δ)) and by setting M
′ = 4M(1− )τ 2n .
C. Second-Order Secrecy Rate
Using Theorems 10 and 16 in (116), we obtain the following complete characterization of the
second-order secrecy rate for semi-deterministic wiretap channels.
Theorem 17: Consider a semi-deterministic DM-WTC PY Z|X . Assume that
1) There exists a unique input distribution P ∗X that achieves the secrecy capacity (113).
2) V (P ∗Y , P
∗
Z|Y ) > 0.
If δ +  < 1, then
R∗i (n, , δ) = CS −
√
VS
n
Q−1
(
δ
1− 
)
+O
(
log n
n
)
, ∀i ∈ {avg, max} (141)
where VS is given in (117). If δ +  ≥ 1, then
R∗avg(n, , δ) ≥ R∗max(n, , δ) ≥ |Y|. (142)
Proof: We first consider the case + δ < 1. On the achievability side, we have
R∗max(n, , δ) ≥ R∗max
(
n, 0,
δ
1− 
)
(143)
= CS −
√
VS
n
Q−1
(
δ
1− 
)
+O
(
log n
n
)
(144)
where (143) follows Theorem 10, and (144) follows from (116). On the converse side, we have
R∗avg(n, , δ) ≤ R∗
(
n, 0
δ
1−  +
1√
n
)
+
1
n
log
n
4(1− ) (145)
= CS −
√
VS
n
Q−1
(
δ
1− 
)
+O
(
log n
n
)
(146)
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where (145) follows from Theorem 16 with τn = 1/
√
n, and (146) follows from (116) and by
Taylor-expanding Q−1(x) around x = δ/(1−). Since R∗max(n, , δ) ≤ R∗avg(n, , δ) by definition,
together (144) and (146) imply the expansion (141) for the case + δ < 1.
By (65), if + δ ≥ 1, then
R∗max(n, , δ) ≥ R∗max(n, 0, 1). (147)
Since the legitimate channel is noiseless and since the function f defining the channel PY |X is
surjective, we can prefix an arbitrary random transformation PYˆ n|Xn to the channel PY n|Xn , and
transmit |Y|n codewords in the channel Yˆ n → Xn → Y n without making an error. Furthermore,
since d(P,Q) ≤ 1 for every pair of probability distributions P and Q, the secrecy constraint is
trivially satisfied without any additional processing. This implies that R∗max(n, 0, 1) ≥ |Y|.
A few remarks are in order.
1) An alternative expression for VS is
VS = Var[logP
∗
Y |Z(f(X)|Z)|X]. (148)
2) It follows from (141) that neither the achievability nor the converse bound in Theorem 13
is tight for the semi-deterministic wiretap channels (unless  = 0).
3) The expansion (141) is still valid if one of the average constraints in the definition of
R∗avg(n, , δ) is replaced with its maximum counterpart.
4) The expansion (141) is still valid if the channel between the transmitter and the eaves-
dropper is discrete input and continuous output.
5) Interestingly, the second-order rate in Theorem 17 does not match the second-order rate
of secret key generation (although the first-order rates in the two settings do match each
other). As shown in Hayashi et al. [41], the latter rate (for independent and identically
distributed sources Xn, Y n, and Zn) is
I(X;Y |Z)−
√
V
n
Q−1(+ δ) +O
(
log n
n
)
(149)
where  denotes the probability that the keys generated by the legitimate users do not
coincide, δ represents a secrecy constraint similar to (27), and V is a constant depending
on the stochastic variation of the sources. This comparison reveals a subtle difference in the
tradeoffs between reliability and secrecy in the two settings. Another interesting observation
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Fig. 3. Maximum secrecy rate R∗avg(n, , δ) for a binary symmetric wiretap channel with crossover probability p = 0.11; here,
δ =  = 10−3.
is that, if the wiretap channel is augmented by an authenticated public discussion channel,
then the second-order secrecy rate is equal to the one in (149) [18].
6) In our conference paper [42], we proved the achievability part of (141) using a stronger
soft-covering lemma for constant-composition codes similar to the one developed in [34].
Our proof here is based on the (strong) privacy amplification result in Lemma 3, and is
much simpler.
D. The Binary Symmetric Wiretap Channel
Consider a specific wiretap channel, where X = Y = Z = F2, PY |X = 1{Y = X}, and PZ|X
is a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability p. We shall refer to this channel as the
binary symmetric wiretap channel (BS-WTC). Without loss of generality, we assume p < 1/2.
Theorem 18: For the BS-WTC with crossover probability p, there exists an (n, 2k, , δ)avg
secrecy code with uniformly distributed message such that
δ
1−  ≤
1
2
min
γ
(
gn(γ) +
√
gn(γ) +
γ
2n−k
hn(γ)
)
(150)
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where k ∈ N,
gn(γ) , 1− E
[
exp
{
−
[
B log
p
1− p + n log(1− p)− log
γ
2n
]+}]
(151)
with [x]+ , max{x, 0} and B following the binomial distribution with parameters n and p, and
hn(γ) , E
[
exp
{
−
∣∣∣B log p
1− p + n log(1− p)− log
γ
2n
∣∣∣}] . (152)
Furthermore, there exists an (n, 2k, , δ)max secrecy code such that
δ
1−  ≤
1
2
min
γ
(
gn(γ) +
√
gn(γ) +
γ
2n−k
hn(γ)
)
+
√
log(2k + 1)
2n−k+1
. (153)
Conversely, every (n,M, , δ)avg secrecy code satisfies
gn
(
2n
M(1− )
)
≤ δ
1− . (154)
Proof: The achievability bounds (150) and (153) follow from strengthened versions of
Lemma 2 and Lemma 4. The converse bound (154) follows by showing that the optimal PX and
QZ in (118) are both uniform distributions over Fn2 . Their proofs are given in Appendix VII.
For the BS-WTC, the reminder term in (141) can be improved to O(1/n).
Theorem 19: For the BS-WTC with crossover probability p, and for every  ≥ 0 and δ > 0
that satisfy + δ < 1, we have
R∗i (n, , δ) = Hb(p)−
√
VBSC
n
Q−1
(
δ
1− 
)
+O
(
1
n
)
, i ∈ {max, avg} (155)
where Hb(·) denotes the binary entropy function, and
VBSC , p(1− p) log2((1− p)/p). (156)
Proof: See Appendix VIII.
Remark 7: The strengthened achievability bounds (150) and (153) are crucial in establishing
the correct order O(1/√n) in the achievability bound. For comparison, the bound (32) in
Lemma 2 yields −1
2
log n for the third-order term.
In Fig. 3, we plot the bounds (150) and (154) for p = 0.11, and δ =  = 10−3. For comparison,
we also plot the general converse bound in (80) and the approximation (155). From this figure,
we see that the new converse bound in (154) is uniformly tighter than (80). Numerically, the
maximum secrecy rate at blocklength 400 is between 0.34 and 0.36 bits/ch. use.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have established nonasymptotic achievability and converse bounds on the
maximum secret communication rate R∗(n, , δ) for a given blocklength n, error probability ,
and information leakage δ over wiretap channels. These bounds are shown to be tighter than
the best previously known bounds. The proofs of our achievability bounds are based on new
privacy amplification results that may be useful for other security problems. We have also
established connections between privacy amplification and channel resolvability, and have used
this connection to derive tighter bounds for channel resolvability.
By analyzing the nonasymptotic bounds, we have further derived upper and lower bounds on
the second-order secrecy rate for general discrete memoryless wiretap channels and for Gaussian
wiretap channels. For the special case of semi-deterministic wiretap channels, we have established
the exact second-order secrecy rate, which characterizes the optimal tradeoff between reliability
and secrecy in the finite-blocklength regime. For general (non-deterministic) wiretap channels,
the problem of establishing the second-order secrecy rate is still open.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The proof is based on random hashing (also known as universal hashing) and the left-over
hash lemma [26], [27].
A. Proof of Part 1
Let G be a random function from X to K that satisfies the following collision probability
bound
P[G(x1) = G(x2)] ≤ 1|K| , ∀x1 6= x2. (157)
In other words, G is a universal2 hash function [43], [26].5 The average secrecy index of G can
be computed as follows:
EG[S(G(X)|Z)] = EG
[
d(PG(X)Z , Q
unif
K PZ)
]
(158)
5One example of a universal2 hash function is the one that is uniformly distributed over the set of all functions from X to
K (see [26, Sec. IV]).
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=
1
2
∑
k∈K,z∈Z
EG
∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈G−1(k)
PXZ(x, z)− 1|K|PZ(z)
∣∣∣∣
 (159)
=
|K|
2
∑
z∈Z
EG
∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈G−1(1)
PXZ(x, z)− 1|K|PZ(z)
∣∣∣∣
 . (160)
Here, (160) follows from the symmetry of the set G.
Observe that the expectation on the RHS of (160) is the first absolute central moment of the
random variable
A(z) ,
∑
x∈G−1(1)
PXZ(x, z). (161)
Indeed, it is not difficult to verify that
E[A(z)] =
PZ(z)
|K| . (162)
An exact computation of the first absolute moment of A(z) is highly complex, and is not
suitable for numerical evaluation or analytical analysis. To get a simpler bound on (160), we
shall split A(z) into two parts A1(z) and A2(z) that satisfy Var[A1(z)] Var[A2(z)], and bound
E[|A(z)− E[A(z)]|] using the triangle inequality as in [27] and [13]. Doing so, we obtain
E[|A(z)− E[A(z)] |] = E[|A1 + A2 − E[A1(z) + A2(z)] |] (163)
≤ 2E[|A1(z)|] + E[|A2(z)− E[A2(z)] |] (164)
≤ 2E[|A1(z)|] +
√
Var[A2(z)]. (165)
Without loss of generality, we can assume that A1(z) and A2(z) take the form
A2(z) =
∑
x∈G−1(z)
RXZ(x, z), A1(z) = A(z)− A2(z) (166)
where RXZ is an arbitrary nonnegative measure (not necessary a probability measure). Substi-
tuting (166) into (165), then (165) into (160), we obtain
E[S(G(X)|Z)] ≤ |K|
∑
k,z
E
∣∣∣ ∑
x∈G−1(1)
(PXZ −RXZ)(x, z)
∣∣∣

+
1
2
|K|
∑
z
√
Var
[ ∑
x∈G−1(1)
RXZ(x, z)
]
(167)
≤ ‖PXZ −RXZ‖1 + 1
2
∑
z
RZ(z)
√
|K|E[‖RG(X)|Z=z −QunifK ‖22] (168)
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where RZ is the projection of RXZ on Z . Here, in (168), we have used the triangular inequality
on the first term on the RHS of (167) and applied the following identity
E
 ∑
x∈G−1(z)
R(x, z)
 = RZ(z)|K| . (169)
The second term on the RHS of (168) can be further bounded as∑
z
RZ(z)
√
E
[‖RG(X)|Z=z −QunifK ‖22]
=
∑
z
√
QZ(z)
√
R2Z(z)
QZ(z)
E
[‖RG(X)|Z=z −QunifK ‖22] (170)
≤
√∑
z
R2Z(z)
QZ(z)
E
[‖RG(X)|Z=z −QunifK ‖22] (171)
≤
√∑
z
R2Z(z)
QZ(z)
∑
x
R2X|Z(x|z) (172)
=
√
exp(−H2(RXZ |QZ)). (173)
Here, H2(RXZ |QZ) , − log
∑
x,z RXZ(x, z)
2/QZ(z) denotes the conditional Re´nyi entropy
of order 2 relative to QZ , (171) follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and because∑
z QZ(z) = 1, and (172) follows from the left-over hash lemma by Bennett et al. [26]. Note
that the steps in (160)–(173) are essentially the ones employed in [27, Sec. 5.5] and [13]. The
reason that we present them here (in a different form) are two-fold. First, as will be shown in
the proof of Lemma 4, the same bounding techniques as above can be used to analyze channel
resolvability. Second, as will be shown in Appendix VII-A, if the distribution PXZ admits further
structures (e.g., symmetry), then the bounds (164) and (165) can be tightened.
We next minimize the RHS of (173) over RXZ . This is unlike the existing privacy amplification
results (for example, those discussed previously), in which one selects a convenient RXZ and
then proves an upper bound on (173). Consider the following optimization problem
min
RXZ :‖PXZ−RXZ‖1≤˜
∑
x,z
RXZ(x, z)
2
QZ(z)
(174)
where ˜ ∈ [0, 2]. It is not difficult to see that the optimal R∗XZ must satisfy R∗XZ(x, z) ≤
PXZ(x, z) for every pair (x, z), i.e., (174) is equivalent to
min
RXZ :‖PXZ−RXZ‖1≤˜, RXZ≤PXZ
∑
x,z
RXZ(x, z)
2
QZ(z)
. (175)
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Indeed, suppose on the contrary that there exists (x0, z0) which satisfy R∗XZ(x0, z0) > PXZ(x0, z0).
Since the objective function in (174) is monotonically increasing with RXZ(x0, z0), we can
further decrease it by setting R∗XZ(x0, z0) = PXZ(x0, z0) without violating the constraint in (174).
But this contradicts the assumption that R∗X,Z is the optimizer of (174). Therefore, we must have
R∗X,Z ≤ PXZ . Observe that the problem (175) is a convex optimization problem. Hence, by
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition [44, Sec. 5.5.3], the optimizer of (175) must take the
form
R∗XZ(x, z) ,
PXZ(x, z) ı(x; z) ≤ log γγQunifX (x)QZ(z) otherwise (176)
where γ is chosen such that ‖PXZ −R∗XZ‖1 = ˜.
Using (176) in the first term on the RHS of (168), we obtain
‖PXZ −R∗XZ‖1 = Eγ(PXZ , QunifX QZ). (177)
The bound (173) can be evaluated as follows:
exp(−H2(R∗XZ |QZ))
=
∑
x,z
R∗XZ(x, z)
2
QZ(z)
(178)
=
1
|X |
∑
x,z
PXZ(x, z) exp(ı(x; z))1{ı(x; z) ≤ log γ}
+
γ2
|X |Q
unif
X QZ [ı(X;Z) ≥ log γ] (179)
=
γ
|X |EPXZ [exp(−|ı(X;Z)− log γ|)]
− γ|X |EPXZ [exp(−|ı(X;Z)− log γ|)1{ı(X;Z) ≥ log γ}]
+
γ2
|X |Q
unif
X QZ [ı(X;Z) ≥ log γ] (180)
=
γ
|X |E
[
exp
(−|ı(X;Z)− log γ|)] . (181)
Substituting (181) into (173), and then (177) and (173) into (168), we conclude that for every
γ > 0,
EG[S(G(X)|Z)] ≤ Eγ(PXZ , QunifX QZ) +
1
2
√
γ|K|
|X | E
[
exp
(−|ı(X;Z)− log γ|)]. (182)
Finally, the inequality (182) implies that there exists a g ∈ G for which (32) holds.
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B. Proof of Part 2
Let G be the set of all functions g from X to K that satisfies ∣∣g−1(k)∣∣ = L for every k ∈ K.
Let G be uniformly distributed over the set G. It is not difficult to check that such a random
function satisfies the collision probability bound (157), i.e., it is a universal2 function. As such, it
satisfies the bound (182). Furthermore, for every g ∈ G we have g(X) ∼ QunifK , where X ∼ QunifX .
This concludes the proof of Part 2.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
By the union bound and the Chernoff bound, we have
P
[
max
k∈K
d(PZ|G−1(k), PZ) ≥ r + µ
]
≤ |K|P[d(PZ|G−1(1), PZ) ≥ r + µ] (183)
≤ |K|e−t(r+µ)E
[
etd(PZ|G−1(1),PZ)
]
(184)
where t is an arbitrary positive constant. Observe that the random variable d(PZ|G−1(1), PZ) can
be rewritten as
d(PZ|G−1(1), PZ) =
1
2
∑
z∈Z
|L−1
∑
x∈G−1(1)
PZ|X(z|x)− PZ(z)| (185)
d
=
1
2
∑
z∈Z
|L−1
∑
i=1,...,L
PZ|X(z|Xi)− PZ(z)| (186)
, h(XL1 ) (187)
where d= denotes equality in distribution, and X1, ..., XL are distributed according to the joint
distribution
PXL1 (x
L
1 ) = Q
unif
X (x1)
L∏
i=2
QunifX\{xL−11 }
(xi). (188)
In other words, XL1 are random samples without replacement from X .
We proceed to upper-bound E
[
eth(X
L
1 )
]
. The key idea is to replace the dependent random
variables XL1 with the i.i.d. samples X¯
L
1 defined in the lemma. More specifically, we shall prove
that
E
[
eth(X
L
1 )
]
≤ E
[
eth(X¯
L
1 )
]
. (189)
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This is done by using the elegant reduction argument of Hoeffding [30]. Let
f(xL1 ) , eth(x
L
1 ). (190)
Since f(·) is symmetric in its arguments, there exists a symmetric function f¯ : X L → R that
satisfies
E
[
f¯(XL1 )
]
= E
[
f(X¯L1 )
]
(191)
as observed in [30, Sec. 5]. Such a function takes the form
f¯(xL1 ) =
∑
pk,r1,...,rk,i1,...,ikf(xi1 , ..., xi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1
, ...., xik , ..., xik︸ ︷︷ ︸
rk
) (192)
where the sum is taken over the integers k, r1, ..., rk, i1, ..., ik such that k ∈ {1, ..., L}, r1 + · · ·+
rk = n, {i1, . . . , ik} ⊂ {1, ..., L} are distinct, and∑
pk,r1,...,rk,i1,...,ik = 1. (193)
To prove (189), it suffices to show that
f¯(xL1 ) ≥ f(xL1 ), ∀xL1 ∈ X L. (194)
Consider the chain of inequalities
f¯(xL1 ) ≥ exp
(
t log(e)
∑
pk,r1,...,rk,i1,...,ikh(xi1 , ..., xi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1
, ...., xik , ..., xik︸ ︷︷ ︸
rk
)
)
(195)
= exp
(t log(e)
2
∑
z∈Z
∑
pk,r1,...,rk,i1,...,ik
∣∣∣gz(xi1 , ..., xi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1
, ...., xik , ..., xik︸ ︷︷ ︸
rk
)
∣∣∣) (196)
≥ exp
(t log(e)
2
∑
z∈Z
∣∣∣∑ pk,r1,...,rk,i1,...,ikgz(xi1 , ..., xi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1
, ...., xik , ..., xik︸ ︷︷ ︸
rk
)
∣∣∣) (197)
= f(xL1 ) (198)
where the functions {gz(·)} are defined as
gz(x
L
1 ) ,
1
L
L∑
i=1
PZ|X(z|xi)− PZ(z). (199)
Here, (195) follows from Jensen’s inequality and the convexity of x 7→ etx; (196) follows
from (187); (197) follows from the triangle inequality; and finally, (198) follows because∑
pk,r1,...,rk,i1,...,ikgz(xi1 , ..., xi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1
, ...., xik , ..., xik︸ ︷︷ ︸
rk
) = gz(x
L
1 ). (200)
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This concludes (194), and, hence (189).
Now, observe that the partial discrete derivatives of h(·) are uniformly bounded, i.e.,
sup
y,y′∈X
|h(xi−11 , y, xLi+1)− h(xi−11 , y′, xLi+1)| ≤
1
L
, i = 1, ..., L. (201)
This allows us to conclude that (see the proof of McDiarmid’s inequality [31] and [45, Eq. (2.2.25)],
and recall that µ = E
[
h(X¯L1 )
]
)
E
[
et(h(X¯
L
1 )−µ)
]
≤ et2/(8L). (202)
Using (202) and (189) in (184), we conclude that
P
[
max
k∈K
d(PZ|G−1(k), PZ) ≥ r + µ
]
≤ |K|e−tr+t2/(8L). (203)
The choice t = 4rL minimizes the RHS of (203) and yields (34).
Finally, using r =
√
log(1 + |K|)/(2L) on the RHS of (34), we obtain
P
[
max
k∈K
d(PZ|G−1(k), PZ) ≥ r + µ
]
≤ |K||K|+ 1 < 1 (204)
which implies (36).
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Consider
EA
[
d(PZ|A, PZ)
]
=
1
2
∑
z∈Z
EX1,...,XL
[∣∣∣ 1
L
∑
i=1,...,L
PZ|X(z|Xi)− PZ(z)
∣∣∣] . (205)
As in the proof of Lemma 2, we shall split the random variable
B(z) , 1
L
∑
i=1,...,L
PZ|X(z|Xi) (206)
into two parts. Let {RZ|X=x}x∈X be a sequence of arbitrary nonnegative measures indexed by x.
Let
B2(z) ,
1
L
∑
i=1,...,L
RZ|X(z|Xi), B1(z) , B(z)−B2(z). (207)
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It follows that
EA
[
d(PZ|A, PZ)
]
=
1
2
∑
z∈Z
E[|B(z)−B1(z)|] (208)
≤
∑
z∈Z
E[|B1(z)|] + 1
2
∑
z∈Z
√
Var[B2(z)] (209)
= ‖PXZ −RZ|XPX‖1 + 1
2
∑
z∈Z
√
L−1Var[RZ|X(z|X)]. (210)
Here, in (209) we have used the triangle inequality and Jensen’s inequality. The second term on
the RHS of (210) can be evaluated as follows:∑
z∈Z
√
Var[RZ|X(z|X)]
=
∑
z
√
QZ(z)
√
1
QZ(z)
Var[RZ|X(z|X)] (211)
≤
√∑
z
1
QZ(z)
Var[RZ|X(z|X)] (212)
≤
√∑
z
1
QZ(z)
E
[
R2Z|X(z|X)
]
. (213)
=
√√√√∑
x,z
R2Z|X(z|x)PX(z)
QZ(z)
. (214)
As in the proof of Lemma 2, we shall minimize the RHS of (214) over all RZ|X that satisfy
‖PXZ −RZ|XPX‖1 ≤ ˜. (215)
The minimizer takes the form
R∗Z|X(z|x) ,

PZ|X(z|x) ı(x; z) ≤ log γ
γQZ(z)
|X |PX(x) otherwise
(216)
where γ is chosen such that ‖PXZ−R∗Z|XPX‖1 = ˜. Substituting (216) into (214), and then (216)
and (214) into (210), we conclude the proof of Lemma 4.
June 14, 2017 DRAFT
40
APPENDIX IV
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Let ı(·; ·) be defined as in (33). Let K , g(X). By definition, for every m ∈ M and every
γ > 0, we have
S(g(X)|Z) ≥ PKZ
[
max
x¯∈g−1(K)
ı(x¯;Z) ≥ log γ
]
− (QunifK PZ)
[
max
x¯∈g−1(K)
ı(x¯;Z) ≥ log γ
]
. (217)
The first term on the RHS of (217) can be bounded as
PKZ
[
max
x¯∈g−1(K)
ı(x¯;Z) ≥ log γ
]
=
∑
k,z
∑
x∈g−1(k)
PXZ(x, z)1
{
max
x¯∈g−1(k)
ı(x¯; z) ≥ log γ
}
(218)
≥
∑
x,z
PXZ(x, z)1
{
ı˜(x; z) ≥ log γ
}
(219)
= PXZ [ı(X;Z) ≥ γ] . (220)
The second term on the RHS of (217) can be bounded using the union bound as follows:
(QunifK PZ)
[
max
x¯∈g−1(K)
ı(x¯;Z) ≥ log γ
]
≤
∑
k∈K
1
|K|
∑
x∈pi−1(k)
PZ [ı(x;Z) ≥ log γ] (221)
=
|X |
|K|Q
unif
X PZ [ı(X;Z) ≥ log γ]. (222)
Substituting (220) and (222) into (217), setting γ = L = |X |/|K|, we obtain
S(g(X)|Z) ≥ PXZ [ı(X;Z) ≥ logL]− L · (QunifX PZ)[ı(X;Z) ≥ logL] (223)
= EL(PXZ , Q
unif
X PZ). (224)
APPENDIX V
PROOF OF THEOREM 13
A. Achievability
To prove the achievability bound (100), we shall use Theorem 8 with a constant-composition
code. The reason for using constant-composition codes instead of i.i.d. codes is two-fold. First,
for a properly chosen QZn , all codewords xn of a constant-composition code have the same
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Eγ(PZn|Xn=xn , QZn). Secondly, constant-composition codes achieve the conditional variances V1
and V2, whereas i.i.d. codes achieve (the slightly bigger) unconditional variances. For simplicity
of presentation, we only prove (100) for the special case in which
CS = max
PX
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z). (225)
Using channel prefixing, we can generalize the proof in a straightforward manner to the case in
which this condition does not hold.
Before presenting the proof, we first introduce some standard notation used in the method of
types [25, Ch. 2]. We denote the simplex of probability distributions on a finite alphabet A by
P(A). The set of all n-types on A is defined as
Pn(A) , {P ∈ P : nP (a) ∈ Z+, ∀a ∈ A}. (226)
The subset of sequences in An with the same type P is denoted by T nP (A) or simply T nP if
the alphabet A is clear from the context. Let Pn ∈ Pn(X ) be the type that is closest in total
variation distance to the (unique) secrecy-capacity-achieving input distribution P ∗X . Furthermore,
let PXn = QunifTPn (X ) denote the uniform distribution over the type class TPn(X ), and let PY n ,
PY n|Xn ◦ PXn . Using the permutation symmetry of the type class TPn(X ) and of the channel
PZn|Xn , it is not difficult to check that the probability term
PY n
[
log
PY n|Xn
PY n
(xn, Y n) ≥ log γ
]
(227)
takes the same value for every xn ∈ TPn(X ). As a consequence, we have by [5, Th. 22]
DT,max(a) = 1− Ea(PXnPY n|Xn , PXnPY n). (228)
Next, we evaluate Ea(PXnPY n|Xn , PXnPY n) for a given a > 0 as follows:
1− Ea(PXnPY n|Xn , PXnPY n)
= inf
γ1>0
{
(PXnPY n|Xn)
[
PY n|Xn
PY n
(Xn, Y n) ≤ γ1
]
+ a(PXnPY n)
[
PY n|Xn
PY n
(Xn, Y n) > γ1
]}
(229)
≤ (PXnPY n|Xn)
[
PY n|Xn
PY n
(Xn, Y n) ≤ √na
]
+
1√
n
. (230)
Here, (229) follows from (7), and (230) follows by relaxing the infimum on the RHS of (229)
with γ1 =
√
na and by applying the standard change of measure technique to the second term
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on the RHS of (229). Suppose that V1 = V (P ∗X , PY |X) > 0. Proceeding as in the proof of [7,
Th. 4.2], we can further upper-bound the RHS of (230) by
Q
(
nI(P ∗X , PY |X)− log(
√
na)√
nV1
)
+O
(
1√
n
)
. (231)
This implies that there exists an
an = n
−1/2 exp
(
nI(X;Y )−
√
nV1Q
−1(−O(1/√n))) (232)
that satisfies
 ≥ 1− Ean(PXnPY n|Xn , PXnPY n). (233)
For the case V1 = 0, we have that
V (Pn, PY |X) = O(1/n) (234)
which follows because |Pn − P ∗X | = O(1/n) and because P 7→ V (P, PY |X) are smooth maps
on the interior of the probability simplex on X . Proceeding step by step as in the proof of [7,
Th. 4.2], and using Chebyshev’s inequality and (234) in place of [7, Eq. (4.53)], we conclude
that (231) and (233) remain to hold if V1 = 0.
Let
γn(xn, δ) , inf
{
γ :Eγ(PZn|Xn=xn , QZn)
+
1
2
√
1
n
E[exp(−|ı(xn;Zn)− log γ|)] +
√
log(1 + an/(nγ))
2nγ
≤ δ
}
(235)
where an is given in (232) and QZn is set to be the product distribution (PZ|X ◦ Pn)n. Setting
γ = supxn∈TPn γn(xn, δ), L = nγ, Mn = an/L, and using (235), (233), and Theorem 8, we
conclude that there exists an (n,Mn, , δ)max secrecy code. Therefore,
R∗max(n, , δ) ≥
1
n
logMn (236)
=
1
n
log an − sup
xn∈TPn (X )
log γn(xn, δ)− log n
n
. (237)
It remains to evaluate γn(xn, δ). Using the permutation symmetry of TPn and of PZn|Xn , we see
that γn(xn, δ) takes the same value for every xn ∈ TPn . We next upper-bound Eγ(PZn|Xn=xn , QZn).
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In the analysis below, we shall assume that V2 = V (P ∗X , PY |X) > 0. The case V2 = 0 can be
handled similarly as in (234). Consider the following chain of (in)equalities:
Eγ(PZn|Xn=xn , QZn) ≤ PZn|Xn=xn
[
log
PZn|Xn=xn
QZn
(Zn) ≥ log γ
]
(238)
= PZn|Xn=xn
[
n∑
i=1
log
PZ|X=xi
(PZ|X ◦ Pn)(Zi) ≥ log γ
]
(239)
≤ Q
(
log γ − nI(Pn, PZ|X)√
nV (Pn, PZ|X)
)
+O
(
1√
n
)
(240)
= Q
(
log γ − nI(P ∗X , PZ|X)√
nV2
)
+O
(
1√
n
)
. (241)
Here, (240) follows from the Berry-Esseen theorem [46, Sec. XVI.5] and [5, Lemma 46],
and (241) follows because |Pn − P ∗X | = O(1/n) and because P 7→ I(P, PZ|X) and P 7→
V (P, PZ|X) are smooth maps on the interior of the probability simplex on X . Furthermore, we
have
E[exp(−|ı(xn;Zn)− log γ|)] ≤ 1 (242)
and √
log(1 + an/(nγ))
2nγ
≤ O
(
1
n
)
(243)
as long as γ ≥ n2. Together (241)–(243) imply that
log γn(xn, δ) ≤ nI(P ∗X , PZ|X) +
√
nV2Q
−1(δ)+O( 1
n
)
. (244)
Substituting (244) into (237) we conclude (100).
B. Converse
We next prove the converse bound (101) using (80). In order to apply (80), we need to select a
QY n |Zn . Before doing so, we remark that in the point-to-point channel coding setting, a converse
bound is usually proved by reducing a code to a constant-composition subcode (see, e.g., [5]
and [47]). The rationale behind this reduction is that removing all codewords except those of a
dominant type reduces the coding rate by at most O((log n)/n), and at the same time it does not
increase the error probability. A converse bound can be then proved by using the meta-converse
bound [5, Th. 27] on the dominant type, with the auxiliary output distribution QY n chosen to be
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the output distribution induced by this type. This reduction argument, however, does not work
for the wiretap channel, because it is not clear how removing codewords will affect the secrecy
index S(W |Z). Instead, we shall choose QY n|Zn to be a mixture of conditional distributions
PY n |Zn induced by all types in Pn(X ). We now proceed with the proof.
For each type P (t)X ∈ Pn, t = 1, . . . , |Pn|, let P (t)Y Z , PY Z|X ◦P (t)X and let P (t)Y |Z be the induced
conditional distribution. Furthermore, let
QY n|Zn(yn | zn) = 1|Pn|
|Pn|∑
t=1
n∏
i=1
P
(t)
Y |Z(yi|zi). (245)
Using this conditional distribution in the bound (80), we obtain that, for every τ ∈ (0, 1− − δ)
and every γ ∈ R,
nR∗avg(n, , δ) ≤ − inf
PXn
log β1−−δ−τ (PXnY nZn , PXnZnQY n |Zn) + log
τ + δ
τ
(246)
≤ γ − log
(
1− − δ − τ − sup
PXn
PXnY nZn
[
log
PXnY nZn
PXnZnQY n |Zn
≥ γ
])
+ log
τ + δ
τ
(247)
where the second step follows from [5, Eq. (102)]. The probability term on the RHS of (247)
can be evaluated as follows:
PXnY nZn
[
PXnY nZn
PXnZnQY n |Zn
≥ γ
]
≤ sup
xn∈Xn
PY nZn |Xn=xn
[
log
PY nZn|Xn=xn
PZn |Xn=xnQY n |Zn
≥ γ
]
. (248)
For an arbitrary xn ∈ X n, let t ∈ {1, . . . , |Pn|} denote the index of the type of xn. Using (245)
and using that log |Pn| ≤ |X | log(n+ 1), we obtain
PY nZn |Xn=xn
[
log
PY nZn|Xn=xn
PZn |Xn=xnQY n |Zn
≥ γ
]
≤ PY nZn |Xn=xn
[
log
PY nZn|Xn=xn
PZn |Xn=xn(P
(t)
Y |Z)
n
≥ γ − |X | log(n+ 1)
]
(249)
= PY nZn |Xn=xn
[
n∑
i=1
log
PY Z|X(Yi, Zi|xi)
PZ|X(Zi|xi)P (t)Y |Z(Yi|Zi)
≥ γ − |X | log(n+ 1)
]
. (250)
Let now
γ˜(α) , inf
ξ : supt{1,...,|Pn|}, xn∈T
P
(t)
X
PY nZn |Xn=xn
[
n∑
i=1
log
PZY |X(Yi, Zi|xi)
PZ|X(Zi|xi)P (t)Y |Z(Yi|Zi)
≥ ξ
]
≥ α
 .
(251)
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Following similar steps as in the proof of [5, Th. 48], and using that P˜ ∗X is the unique maximizer
of (99), that V˜ (P˜ ∗X , PY Z|X) > 0, and that PX 7→ I(X;Y |Z) is concave, we obtain
γ˜(α) = nCuS −
√
nVcQ
−1(1− α) +O(log n). (252)
Finally, setting γ = |X | log(n + 1) + γ˜(1 −  − δ − τ) and τ = 1/√n, and using (252), (250),
and (248) in (247), we conclude the proof of (101).
C. The + δ > 1 Case
By (65), if + δ > 1, then
R∗max(n, , δ) ≥ R∗max
(
n,
+ δ − 1
δ
, 1
)
. (253)
By [5, Sec. IV.A], the maximum communication rate over the legitimate channel for a given
blocklength n and maximum error probability (+ δ − 1)/δ is lower-bounded by
Clegit −
√
Vlegit
n
Q−1
(
+ δ − 1
δ
)
+O
(
log n
n
)
. (254)
Furthermore, since d(P,Q) ≤ 1 for every pair of probability distributions P and Q, the secrecy
constraint is trivially satisfied without any additional processing. This implies (105).
APPENDIX VI
PROOF OF THEOREM 14
To prove (108), we shall use Theorem 8 with PXn being the uniform distribution over the
power sphere Sn , {xn ∈ Rn : ‖xn‖2 = nP} and with QZn ∼ N (0, (P + N2)In). For such a
PXn it was shown in [48] that there exists an
a˜n = exp
(n
2
log(1 + P/N1)−
√
nV1Q
−1(− /√n) +O(log n)
)
(255)
that satisfies
RCU(a˜n) ≤ (1− 1/
√
n)− /√n. (256)
Setting an = a˜n/
√
n, τ = 1− 1/√n, and using (48), we conclude that
RCU,max(an) ≤ τ−1RCU(a˜n) ≤ . (257)
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Furthermore, from (255), we see that
log an =
n
2
log(1 + P/N1)−
√
nV1Q
−1() +O(log n). (258)
We next evaluate (49). Due to the spherical symmetry of Sn and QZn , we have that for every
xn ∈ Sn
Eγ(PZn |Xn=xn , QZn) = Eγ(PZn |Xn=x¯n , QZn) (259)
where
x¯n , [
√
P , . . . ,
√
P ]. (260)
The RHS of (259) can be evaluated
Eγ(PZn |Xn=x¯n , QZn)
≤ PZn |Xn=x¯n
[
log
dPZn |Xn=x¯n
dQZn
(Zn) ≥ log γ
]
(261)
= Q
(
log γ − n log(1 + P/N2)√
nV2
)
+O
(
1√
n
)
(262)
where the last step follows from [5, p. 2357]. The proof of (108) follows by repeating the
steps (235)–(244) with (262) used in place of (241).
To prove the converse bound (109), we assume that the channel PY nZn|Xn is physically
degraded. This assumption comes without loss of generality since the maximal coding rate
R∗(n, , δ) depends on the channel law PY nZn |Xn only through the marginal transition proba-
bilities PY n |Xn and PZn |Xn [4, Lemma 3.4]. We shall use Theorem 12 with
QY n |Zn = N
(
P +N1
P +N2
zn,
(P +N1)(N2 −N1)
P +N2
In
)
(263)
which coincides with the marginal conditional distribution PY n|Zn of PXnY nZn for the case
Xn ∼ N (0, P In). Observe that, by the data-processing inequality for βα(·, ·), we have
βα(PXnY nZn , PXnZnQY n|Zn) ≥ βα(PXn+1Y n+1Zn+1 , PXn+1Zn+1QY n+1|Zn+1). (264)
By (264) and [5, Lemma 39], it suffices to consider the case where PXn is supported on the
power sphere Sn. Furthermore, by the spherical symmetry of PY nZn|Xn , QY n|Xn , and Sn, and
by using [5, Lemma 29], we obtain that, for every PXn supported on Sn,
βα(PXnY nZn , PXnZnQY n|Zn) = βα(PY nZn|Xn=x¯n , PZn|Xn=x¯nQY n|Zn) (265)
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where x¯n is defined in (260).
To evaluate the asymptotic behavior of the RHS of (265) we observe that, under PY nZn |Xn=x¯n ,
the random variable log dPY nZn |Xn=x¯n
d(PZn |Xn=x¯nQY n |Zn )
(Y n, Zn) has the same distribution as
nCS +
log e
2
n∑
i=1
(
(Ui + U¯i)
2
N2
− U
2
i
N1
+
(
√
P + Ui)
2
P +N1
− (
√
P + Ui + U¯i)
2
P +N2
)
(266)
where {U¯i} are i.i.d. N (0, N2 − N1)-distributed, and {Ui} are i.i.d. N (0, N1) distributed. As
in [5, Sec. IV.B], a central limit theorem analysis of (266) shows that
− log βα(PY nZn|Xn=x¯n , PZn|Xn=x¯nQY n|Zn) = nCS −
√
nVcQ
−1(1− α) +O(log n) (267)
where Vc is given in (112). Setting α = 1 −  − δ − τ and τ = 1/
√
n, and substituting (267)
and (265) into (80), we conclude (109).
APPENDIX VII
PROOF OF THEOREM 18
A. Achievability
To prove the achievability bound (150), we shall use a strengthened version of the privacy
amplification lemma (Lemma 2). Fix a positive integer k and let M , 2k. Let X = Z = Fn2 ,
let K = M = {1, ...,M}, and let PX and QZ be the uniform distributions over X and Z ,
respectively. Let PZ|X denote the channel law of n uses of a BSC. It follows that PZ|X◦PX = QZ .
Furthermore, let G be uniformly distributed over the set of functions g from X → K satisfying
|g−1(`)| = 2n−k, for every ` ∈ K. As in the proof of Lemma 2, we can rewrite the average
security index as
S(G(X)|Z) = |K|
2
∑
z
E[|A1(z) + A2(z)− E[A1(z) + A2(z)]|] (268)
where A1(z) and A2(z) are defined in (166) with RXZ taking the form (176). Different from (165),
we now upper-bound the absolute value in (268) as follows:
E[|A1(z) + A2(z)− E[A1(z) + A2(z)] |]
≤ E[|A1(z)|] + E[|A2(z)− E[A1(z) + A2(z)] |] (269)
≤ E[|A1(z)|] +
√
E[|A2(z)− E[A1(z) + A2(z)] |2] (270)
≤ E[|A1(z)|] +
√
E[|A1(z)|]2 + Var[A2(z)]. (271)
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Now, by the symmetry of PZ|X , QZ , PX , and RXZ , it can be shown that E[|A1(z)|] is independent
of z. This guarantees that∑
z∈Z
1
QZ(z)
E[|A1(z)|]2 =
(∑
z∈Z
E[|A1(z)|]
)2
. (272)
Substituting (271) into (268), using (272), and following straightforward computations, we obtain
S(G(X)|Z) ≤ 1
2
min
γ
(
gn(γ) +
1
2
√
gn(γ) +
γ
2n−k
hn(γ)
)
. (273)
This implies that there exists a function g : X →M such that g(X) ∼ QunifM and that S(g(X)|Z)
is upper-bounded by the RHS of (273). Setting W = g(X), PX|W = Qunifg−1(W ), and using that
the legitimate channel is noiseless, we conclude that there exists an (n, 2k, 0, δ˜)avg secrecy code
with δ˜ upper-bounded by the RHS of (273). The claimed achievability bound (150) follows then
from (66).
Similarly, Lemma 4 can be strengthened to show that for a random codebook A with 2n−k
i.i.d. PX-distributed codewords, if PZ|X is a BSC, then
EA
[
d(PZ|A, PZ)
] ≤ 1
2
min
γ
(
gn(γ) +
1
2
√
gn(γ) +
γ
2n−k
hn(γ)
)
. (274)
Using this result and Lemma 3 on the BS-WTC, we conclude the bound (153).
B. Converse
The proof of the converse bound (154) follows by showing that the optimal PX and QZ
of (118) are both uniform distributions over Fn2 . For the BS-WTC with n channel uses, the
left-hand side (LHS) of (118) is equivalent to
min
PXn∈P(Fn2 )
min
QZn∈P(Fn2 )
E |X|n
M(1−)
(PXnZn , Q
unif
Fn2
QZn). (275)
Our proof relies on the following properties of the function Eγ(PXnZn , QunifFn2 QZn).
• Translation invariance: for every PXn and every QZn supported on Fn2 , the value of the
function Eγ(PXnZn , QunifFn2 QZn) does not change if we translate PXn and QZn by a fixed
vector vn ∈ {0, 1}n simultaneously, i.e.,
Xn → Xn ⊕ vn (276)
Zn → Zn ⊕ vn. (277)
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• Convexity: the map (PXn , QZn) 7→ Eγ(PXnZn , QunifFn2 QZn) is convex for every γ > 0. This
follows because the Eγ divergence is an f -divergence, and every f -divergence is jointly
convex in its arguments [49].
For a given vector vn ∈ {0, 1}n and a given probability distribution Xn ∼ PXn , we define
P v
n
Xn as the probability distribution of X
n⊕vn, and P¯Xn as the distribution of Xn⊕V n with V n
uniformly distributed over Fn2 . It is not difficult to see that P¯Xn is also a uniform distribution.
The probability distributions QvnZn and Q¯Zn are defined similarly. Now, by Jensen’s inequality
and the translation invariance and convexity of Eγ(·, ·), we have
Eγ(PXnPZn|Xn , QunifFn2 QZn)
=
1
2n
∑
vn∈{0,1}n
Eγ(P
vn
XnPZn|Xn , Q
unif
Fn2
Qv
n
Zn) (278)
≥ Eγ(P¯XnPZn|Xn , QunifFn2 Q¯Zn). (279)
Therefore, (275) is indeed minimized by uniform distributions. Note that, the function gn(γ) is
equal to
gn(γ) = Eγ(Q
unif
Fn2
PZn|Xn , QunifFn2 Q
unif
Fn2
). (280)
This concludes the converse bound (154).
APPENDIX VIII
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The converse part of (155) follows from (154) and the following estimate
log g−1n (t) = n log 2− nHb(p) +
√
nVBSCQ
−1(t) +O(1) (281)
which can be distilled from [5, Sec. IV.A.1]. Here, g−1n (t) : [0, 1]→ [0,∞) denotes the pseudo-
inverse of the non-increasing function gn(·)
g−1n (t) , inf{x ∈ [0,∞) : gn(x) ≤ t}. (282)
To prove the achievability part of (155), we shall evaluate the upper bound in (153) with
the parameters k = bn − log2(g−1n (δ˜))c and γ = 2n−k for some arbitrary δ˜ ∈ (0, 1). Since
γ 7→ gn(γ) is non-increasing (because gn(γ) corresponds to the Eγ “distance” between two
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probability distributions, which is non-increasing in γ; see (280)), and since γ ≥ g−1n (δ˜), it
follows that
gn(γ) ≤ gn(g−1n (δ˜)) ≤ δ˜. (283)
The term hn(γ) in (153) can be rewritten as
hn(γ) = E
[
exp
{
−
n∑
i=1
Zi + n log(1− p) + log 2k
}
1
{
n∑
i=1
Zi > −n log(1− p)− log 2k
}]
+E
[
exp
{ n∑
i=1
Zi − n log(1− p)− log 2k
}
1
{
n∑
i=1
Zi ≤ −n log(1− p)− log 2k
}]
(284)
where Zi , Bi log(p/(1 − p)) with {Bi} i.i.d. Bern(p) distributed. Using [5, Lemma 47] on
both terms on the RHS of (284), we obtain
hn(γ) ≤ c1(p)√
n
(285)
where
c1(p) ,
4√
VBSC
(
log 2√
2piVBSC
+
12p|Hb(p)− log p|3
VBSC
+
12(1− p)|Hb(p) + log(1− p)|3
VBSC
)
(286)
is a constant independent of n. Using (283) and (285) in (153), we conclude that there exists
an (n, 2k, 0, δˆ)max secrecy code that satisfies
k = bn− log2(g−1n (δ˜))c (287)
and
δˆ =
1
2
δ˜ +
1
2
√
δ˜2 +
c1(p)√
n
+
√
log(2k + 1)
2n−k+1
(288)
= δ˜ +O
(
1√
n
)
. (289)
This implies that
R∗max
(
n, 0, δˆ
)
≥ 1
n
log(2)
(
n− (log2)g−1n
(
δˆ −O
( 1√
n
))
− 1
)
(290)
= Hb(p)−
√
VBSC
n
Q−1
(
δˆ
)
+O
(
1
n
)
. (291)
Here, the second step follows from (281) and by Taylor-expanding Q−1(x) around x = δˆ.
Combining (65) and (291) we conclude the proof.
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